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∗ University

of Pennsylvania, † University of Massachusetts, ‡ University of Minnesota
kkw@seas.upenn.edu, lgao@ecs.umass.edu, guerin@ee.upenn.edu, zhzhang@cs.umn.edu

Abstract—With network components increasingly reliable,
routing is playing an ever greater role in determining network
reliability. This has spurred much activity in improving routing
stability and reaction to failures, and rekindled interest in
centralized routing solutions, at least within a single routing
domain. Centralizing decisions eliminates uncertainty and many
inconsistencies, and offers added flexibility in computing routes
that meet different criteria. However, it also introduces new
challenges; especially in reacting to failures where centralization
can increase latency. This paper leverages the flexibility afforded
by centralized routing to address these challenges. Specifically,
we explore when and how standby backup forwarding options
can be activated, while waiting for an update from the centralized
server after the failure of an individual component (link or
node). We provide analytical insight into the feasibility of such
backups as a function of network structure, and quantify their
computational complexity. We also develop an efficient heuristic
reconciling protectability and performance, and demonstrate its
effectiveness in a broad range of scenarios. The results should
facilitate deployments of centralized routing solutions.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Intra-domain routing in IP networks has traditionally relied
on distributed computations among routers, with the concatenation of individual forwarding decisions eventually resulting
in packet delivery. In spite of their inherent adaptability and
scalability, distributed computations can make troubleshooting
harder, because of the many sources of inconsistencies they
allow. This has renewed interest in centralized routing solutions [4], [6], [21] for IP networks, at least in settings where
scalability is less of a concern, e.g., intra-domain routing.
Centralizing decisions not only guarantees full visibility into
the forwarding state of individual routers (now essentially
cheap forwarding engines or FEs), it also affords added
flexibility in computing paths that meet different requirements.
In spite of its advantages and even when scalability is
not an issue, centralizing decisions has disadvantages. Of
particular concern for reliability is latency in reacting to
failures, i.e., the central server needs to be notified, react to the
failure, and communicate updated forwarding information to
all affected FEs. This can result in non-negligible “gaps” after
failures, during which FEs have no valid forwarding states
for some destinations, and translate into substantial packet
losses. A natural approach to the problem is through preventive
mechanisms, e.g., by having the central server pre-compute
This work was supported by NSF grants CNS-0627004, CNS-0626617, and
CNS-0626808.

forwarding decisions for common (most) failure scenarios, and
pre-load those in the FEs so that updated forwarding state
is locally available. However, even such solutions have their
limitations. For one, the sheer volume of alternate forwarding
states across failure scenarios will likely require that it be
stored in “slow” memory to keep costs low. As a result,
updating data path forwarding tables could take time. More
importantly, even if the central server does not have to
download updated forwarding state, it remains responsible for
coordinating when and which FEs switch-over to the new state.
As discussed in [13], failure to do so can introduce forwarding
loops, whose effect can be worse than failures.
Ensuring uninterrupted (or minimally interrupted) packet
forwarding in the presence of failures remains, therefore, a
significant challenge in centralized routing systems. Our goal
in this paper is to explore a possible solution to this problem,
and in the process take centralized routing one step closer
to offering an effective alternative for intra-domain routing.
Furthermore, because a corollary of centralized routing is
simplified FEs, we seek to realize this goal with no or
minimal impact on data plane complexity. In particular, we
want to avoid either encapsulation-based solutions that require
additional packet manipulations, as well as packet marking
and interface specific forwarding solutions that often call
for significant expansion to the size (and therefore cost) of
forwarding tables. Instead, our goal is to allow all (most) FEs
to have, for each destination present in their forwarding tables,
a pre-configured next-hop to which packets for that destination
can be forwarded in case of failure of the primary next-hop(s).
The trigger to switch to backup forwarding is entirely local
(i.e., unavailability of the primary next-hop(s)), and forwarding
loops should be precluded.
In other words, we consider an IP network where (intradomain) routing is under the responsibility of a central server,
so that routers (FEs) are only responsible for (destinationbased) packet forwarding. Because of the use of a central
server, path computation is not restricted to shortest paths
based on a common set of link weights. Instead, each destination prefix is associated with an “independently” computed
(primary) forwarding tree (more generally a directed acyclic
graph, or DAG), rooted at the egress node associated with
the destination. Our goal is then to compute a set of primary
routing trees (or DAGs), one for each destination, so that all

nodes in the tree, or when not feasible1 as many nodes as
possible, have a standby alternate next-hop available when
the primary next-hop becomes unreachable. We term such a
routing, protection routing, and introduce it more formally
in Section III. Protection routing is readily realized when
each node in the DAG has two or more independent nexthops towards the destination, e.g., as sought in [18], [14].
Its simplicity not withstanding, this is easily shown not to
be simultaneously feasible for all nodes (at least one node
is limited to only one next-hop). Furthermore, it ignores the
option for two nodes to mutually protect each other, and
exploring the benefits this affords is one of the motivations for
this paper. In addition, while standby protection to failures is
desirable, its impact on operational performance should also
be accounted for. Incorporating this aspect when computing
protection routing is another goal of the paper.
The concept of protection routing as just defined bears
similarities with a number of related concepts, and we expand
on this in Section II. The paper nevertheless makes a number
of novel contributions and in particular:
1) It offers new insight into network topological properties
that ensure the feasibility of protection routing;
2) It establishes that computing a protection routing is an
NP-hard problem;
3) It develops a heuristic for computing a routing that
reconciles the often conflicting goals of protectability and
performance;
4) It demonstrates the heuristic’s ability to realize an effective trade-off between protectability and performance
across a range of network topologies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews related works and contrasts the approach and findings of the paper against them. Section III introduces the
concept of protectability more formally and defines protection
routing. Section IV is devoted to an analytical investigation
of protection routing, while Section V leverages insight from
this analysis to develop a heuristic for computing protection
routings. The heuristic favors protectability, while trying to
minimize its impact on performance. The underlying tradeoff is further investigated in Section VI, which develops a
modified heuristic that allows relaxed protectability goals for
the sake of improving performance. Section VII evaluates the
efficacy of the heuristics in several different scenarios, and
Section VIII summarizes the paper’s findings.
II. R ELATED W ORKS
This paper considers a centralized routing system similar to
that proposed in [4], [6], [21]. In those works, the primary
motivation for centralizing path computation was manageability. In [13], an efficient message-dissemination solution
was proposed to minimize signaling overhead and avoid the
formation of transient loops in such an environment. This
paper builds on these earlier works by assuming a centralized
1 It is easy to construct network graphs for which no matter what routing
is chosen, one or more nodes have no alternate next-hop.

routing solution, but differs in its focus. Its aim is to overcome
problems associated with the potential for increased latency
after failures, because of the system’s reliance on a central
server responsible for coordinating updates to the forwarding
states of FEs. Our motivations and general approach for
handling this issue are similar in principle to those behind
many of the IP fast re-routing (IPFRR) schemes that have been
proposed (see [19] for a generic introduction to IPFRR and its
goals). We expand below on specific differences between our
solution and individual IPFRR mechanisms, but an important
contributor to those differences comes from our ability to exploit the flexibility afforded by centralized path computations
to produce routing solutions that are difficult, if not impossible,
to realize in the traditional, distributed environment assumed
by most IPFRR solutions.
IPFRR’s main goal is to ensure fast (sub-50ms) convergence
of intra-domain routing protocols, as soon as failures have
been detected. Current proposals fall in either one of two
categories: those that can operate with an unmodified IP
forwarding plane; and those that involve the use of a different
(usually more complex) forwarding paradigm. The former
category is the more relevant to this paper, which also seeks to
offer protection to failure while preserving the simplicity and
scalability of IP forwarding. In particular, one of our goals is
to maximize the fast re-routing “coverage” achievable in any
network by taking advantage of the flexibility of centralized
routing in computing paths and controlling local forwarding
decisions at each FE.
Examples of IPFRR mechanisms belonging to the first
category include Loop-free alternate (LFA) [1], O2 [18],
[16], [15], DIV-R [14] and MARA [12]. The LFA proposal
of [1] is aimed primarily at IP networks that run distributed,
shortest-path-based routing algorithms. Furthermore, it relies
on a criterion for ensuring loop freedom when selecting nexthop alternates (backups) (see [1][Inequality 1]) similar to
the invariant of [14]. As alluded to earlier, imposing such a
requirement prevents neighboring nodes from backing each
other up (the criterion enforces an ordering among nodes, so
that only one is eligible as a backup for the other). Both factors
limit the coverage that the scheme is able to provide. This
limitation is not present in O2 [18], which is not restricted to
using shortest paths and that introduces the concept of “joker”
links specifically for the purpose of allowing mutual backups.
These similarities make the O2 body of work [18], [16], [15]
the most relevant to this paper, and it is, therefore, important
to articulate differences in both scope and contributions.
O2 shares with this paper its applicability to (or more
precisely, need for) a centralized routing system, and the goal
of maximizing the number of nodes that are protected against
any single link or node failure. In O2, this is realized by
ensuring that every node has an “out-degree” (number of nexthops) of two - hence the name O2 - with one of them available
as a backup in case of failures. This is similar to our goal as
stated in Section I, with the difference that we do not seek to
impose a limit of two on the out-degree, and will often allow
more, especially when trying to reconcile the need for load-

balancing with protectability. As a matter of fact, exploring the
trade-off that exists between protectability and performance is
one of the important differences between our work and O2.
This difference is further reflected in the path computation
algorithm we propose to jointly optimize protectability and
performance. We demonstrate in Section VII the benefits of
our algorithm in terms of both performance and protectability,
when compared to O2 algorithms [15]. Another difference
between our work and the O2 contributions is our focus on
identifying specific conditions for the feasibility of a protection
routing, and conversely the complexity of finding one when it
exists. In particular, we formally establish in Section IV that
the problem of computing a protection routing is NP-hard,
and provide several characterizations of network topology that
affect the feasibility of protection routing.
The DIV-R algorithm of [14] and the several MARA
algorithms of [12] have similar goals as O2 and this paper,
but differ in their approaches. DIV-R proposes a distributed
algorithm to maximize a metric that reflects the number
of next-hops available to each node. This may be effective
against link failures, but as shown in Section VII, less so
when considering node failures. The MARA algorithms consider several path computation problems aimed at improving
minimum connectivity and fully utilizing all available links;
hence affording greater resilience to failures (MARA’s all-toone maximum connectivity problem is the most relevant, and
similar in spirit to DIV-R). As with DIV-R, protection against
node failures is not explicitly taken into account and neither
is the trade-off between performance and protectability.
The second category of IPFRR works includes [22], [7],
[20], [10], which seek to deliver protectability irrespective of
network topological limitations at the cost of possible changes
to packet forwarding. For example, [22] considers the use of
interface-specific forwarding tables to handle packet re-routing
after failures while preventing loops. Multiple “topologies”
are used in [7], each covering different failures, with routers
switching from one to another upon detecting a given failure
and marking packets according to the topology to be used
to overcome it. In [20], protection is achieved by using
tunnels to detour packets around failures; hence requiring
packet encapsulation and decapsulation. Finally, [10] proposes
carrying root-cause failure information in packets to allow
routers to diagnose problems and select alternate paths.
III. M ODEL AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
We model the network as a directed graph G = (V, E),
with V the node set, E the link set, and |V | = n. A directed
link from node i to node j is denoted by (i, j). NG (i) =
{j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} is the neighbor set of node i in G. As
discussed in Section I, we assume that information such as
network topology and link bandwidth is available to a central
server for the purpose of path computation. We further assume
that packet forwarding is destination-based without reliance
on packet marking or encapsulation even in the presence of
failures, i.e., the standard IP forwarding paradigm.

For a destination2 d ∈ V , let Rd = (V, Ed ) be a routing
for traffic destined to d, where Ed ⊆ E. Rd is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) rooted at d and defines a destinationbased routing. In Rd , every node i ∈ V \ {d} has at least one
outgoing link. A node j is called a primary next-hop (PNH)
of node i if (i, j) ∈ Ed , and the link (i, j) is called a primary
link of node i. If a node has multiple PNHs, traffic is split
evenly across them. One advantage of centralized routing is
that Rd ’s can be computed independently of each other. In
contrast, a standard IGP such as OSPF computes routings that
are coupled by a common set of link weights. Thus, without
loss of generality, in the remainder of this section we focus
on a single destination d.
When computing Rd , our goal is to preserve uninterrupted
packet forwarding in the presence of any single “component”
(link or node) failure, except for that of d itself.
Definition 3.1: After a single component failure f, the
resulting network and routing for destination d are denoted
by Gf and Rdf , respectively. Gf and Rdf are constructed by
removing the failed component (node and/or link(s)) associated with f from G and Rd respectively.
Definition 3.2: Node i is said to be upstream of node j in
a routing Rd if there exists a path from node i to node j in
Rd . Conversely, node j is then downstream of node i.
Definition 3.3: In a routing Rd , node i 6= d is said to be
protected (with respect to d), if after any single component
failure f that affects node i’s PNH(s), there exists a node k ∈
NGf (i) such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1) Node k is not upstream of node i in Rdf .
2) Node k and all its downstream nodes (except d) have at
least one PNH in Rdf .
Node k is called a secondary next-hop (SNH) of node i for f
and d. By convention, destination d is always protected.
Definition 3.3 is inspired by LFA but does not mandate the
use of shortest paths, nor does it require [1][Inequality 1] to
prevent loops. The two conditions of Definition 3.3 imply that
when the PNH of node i fails and packets are rerouted to node
k: (i) routing loops never form (condition (1)); and (ii) packets
are delivered to d through node k and its downstream nodes
in Rdf (condition (2)). Examples illustrating the feasibility or
infeasibility of these conditions are provided in Section III-A.
Definition 3.4: Rd is said to be a protection routing if every
node i ∈ V is protected in Rd .
Definition 3.5: A graph G = (V, E) is said to be protectable if a protection routing exists ∀ d ∈ V .
By Definition 3.4, if Rd is a protection routing, packet
forwarding (and delivery) to d can proceed uninterrupted in
the presence of any single component failure (besides that of
d itself). The main challenges are in identifying when such
routings are feasible, and in computing them, or when not
feasible, computing routings that maximize the number of
protected nodes. We discuss these in Sections IV, V, and VI,
but proceed first with some illustrative examples.
2 For simplicity, we associate each node with a single destination, while in
practice this would encompass all prefixes for which a node is the egress.
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A. Discussion
Fig. 1 illustrates on a simple network topology how different
routing choices affect protectability for a destination d. The
routing of Fig. 1(a) does not protect nodes 1, 2, 3 and 6
under Definition 3.3. For example, although node 1 has two
PNHs, it is not protected against a failure of node 2. This
is because its other PNH, node 4, is itself upstream of the
failed node 2 (this violates condition (2) of Definition 3.3).
Similarly, node 6 is not protected against a failure of link
(6, d), as its two neighbors, nodes 4 and 5, are both upstream
of itself (this violates condition (1) of Definition 3.3). The
routing of Fig. 1(b) succeeds in protecting node 6 against the
failure of link (6, d), because node 5 is now a valid SNH.
However, according to condition (2) of Definition 3.3, node
1 is still not protected against a failure of node 2, as even
if node 4 now has a PNH (i.e., node 6) that does not rely on
node 2, it will still forward some packets destined to d towards
node 3 (node 4 is unaware of the failure of node 2 and loadbalances across its two PNHs) that remains unprotected. This
last issue is resolved in Fig. 1(c), where all nodes are now
protected. Note that to ensure protectability, more links are left
unused during normal operations, so that they are available for
mutual backups after failures. This illustrates the tension that
exists between performance and protectability, and is one of
the issues we explore further in Sections VI and VII.
Fig. 1(d) illustrates a subtle issue that arises from the choice
of conditions in Definition 3.3, and in particular condition (2)
that calls for backup paths to only use PNHs. Fig. 1(d) gives an
example of a routing that node 2 is not protected according
to Definition 3.3, but that is still able to deliver packets to
d after a failure of node 5. This is because, when node 5
fails, node 2 forwards packets to its SNH, node 3, which
passes them to its PNH, node 4. Node 4’s PNH, however,
was also node 5, so that it must also forward packets to its
own SNH, node 6, which finds itself in a similar situation
and forwards packets to its own SNH, namely, d. This does
ensure delivery of packets to d, but violates condition (2)
of Definition 3.3. An intuitive “fix” might seem to simply

relax condition (2) to allow packet forwarding using both
PNH and SNH. This is unfortunately not possible, as such
a relaxation could allow the formation of loops. In general,
instances where backup paths such those of Fig. 1(d) improve
protectability appear to be limited. Furthermore, systematically
exploring them can add significant computational complexity,
as all possible combinations of PNHs and SNHs need to be
considered. Section V-D introduces a compromise based on an
algorithm that iterates over possible SNH assignments once a
choice of PNHs has been finalized, and allows the discovery
of paths such as those of Fig. 1(d).
IV. A NALYSIS
In this section, we model a network as an undirected graph
G = (V, E), so that finding a protection routing is equivalent
to identifying an orientation for a subset of links such that
every node is protected, i.e., an ordering among nodes that
makes re-routing possible without creating loops. Its existence
depends on routing choices and the topological structure of
the network. The goal of this section is to analyze what
topological properties are sufficient to ensure protectability and
characterize the algorithmic complexity of finding it. Due to
space limitations, all proofs are in [9]. Graph terminology not
defined in the paper can be found in [3].
A. Does a simple sufficient condition exist?
We first consider the existence of sufficient conditions
for protectability. A necessary condition for a graph to be
protectable is for every node to have two neighbors. Thus,
it is natural to ask if the node degree of a graph can be used
to characterize protectability. A simple sufficient condition for
a graph to be protectable is as follows.
Theorem 4.1: Every graph with n ≥ 5 nodes and minimum
degree at least ⌈n/2⌉ is protectable.
Theorem 4.1 cannot be improved in that we cannot replace
the bound of ⌈n/2⌉ with ⌊n/2⌋ , as there exists a 1-nodeconnected graph3 with minimum degree ⌊n/2⌋ , which is
obviously not protectable.
Theorem 4.1 implies that in the absence of any global
graph property, a high minimum degree is needed to guarantee
protectability. A natural next step is to explore if introducing
global graph properties such as link- and node-connectedness
can yield less stringent sufficient conditions for protectability.
Intuitively, k-link-connectedness, for k large enough, would
seem sufficient to ensure protectability. Surprisingly, this is
not true in general, no matter how large k is. The result is
summarized as follows.
Theorem 4.2: For any given k ∈ Z+ , there exists a k-linkconnected graph that is unprotectable.
Theorem 4.2 establishes that even with arbitrarily many
link-disjoint paths, a protection routing is not guaranteed to
exist. A similar question can be asked using the stronger
condition of node-connectedness. In this setting, we only have
the weaker result of Theorem 4.3 and a conjecture as follows.
3 If n is odd, such a graph can be constructed by taking the union of two
copies of complete graph K ⌈n/2⌉ connected at one node.

Theorem 4.3: For k = 2, 3, there exists a k-node-connected
graph that is unprotectable.
Conjecture 4.1: For any given k ≥ 4, there exists a k-nodeconnected graph that is unprotectable.
The reason the relatively strong properties of Theorems 4.2
and 4.3 fail to ensure protectability is because destinationbased routing induces an ordering among nodes; something
that is not present when, for example, computing node-disjoint
paths. Hence, even if each node individually has several disjoint paths to a destination, this need not hold when coupling
them through a common destination-based routing.

Our goal is to compute n routings (one for each destination)
to maximize protectability while realizing good network performance (e.g., congestion) in normal (failure-free) situations.
Computing a routing to minimize the number of unprotected
node for a destination is NP-hard because the decision version of the problem is NP-complete. Because all n routings
contribute to link loads, adding the dimension of performance
introduces a coupling that only makes the problem harder.
Practical solutions must, therefore, rely on heuristics.

B. On random graphs

A. Heuristic outline

The previous results showed that even graphs with very
rich connectivity, e.g., large degree or connectedness, were
not guaranteed to be protectable. However, the proofs of these
results involved graphs with very specific structure. A natural
question is whether such graphs are the norm or the exception.
To explore this question, we rely on a family of graphs with
little or no special structure, i.e., random graphs, and investigate what can be said about their protectability. We use ErdösRényi random graphs G(n, p), where n denotes the number
of nodes and p is the link probability, and analyze under what
conditions such graphs are protectable as n becomes large.
This calls for finding routings for each destination such that
all nodes have a suitable SNH to reroute traffic after failures.
The random and relatively homogeneous structure of random
graphs makes it possible to establish the following result.
Theorem 4.4: Let G ∈ G(n, p) and p = (4 + ε) log n/n
where ε > 0 is any constant and log is the natural logarithm.
Then asymptotically almost surely G is protectable.
Theorem 4.4 implies that a mean degree that grows like
O (log n) is sufficient to ensure that a random graph is
protectable with probability tending to 1 as n → ∞. In other
words, in the absence of structure explicitly aimed at defeating
it, the level of connectivity required to ensure protectability
is significantly lower than that required by Theorem 4.1.
Although random graphs are not representative of all network
topologies, this provides some hope that protectability is feasible in many practical networks with reasonable connectivity.
The next section is devoted to assessing how difficult a task
computing such protection routings is.

Our heuristic seeks routings Rd , ∀ d ∈ V, that minimize
the number Ωd of unprotected nodes for their respective
destination, and that together minimize network congestion
in the absence of failure. Network congestion is measured
through a cost function
P Φ. For illustration purposes, we select
the function Φ =
l∈E Φl of [5], where Φl denotes the
congestion cost of link l as a function of its load. Other
expressions for Φ can be readily used.
To keep computational complexity low and preserve the
ability to independently compute routings that minimize Ωd for
each d ∈ V while accounting for performance (congestion),
we design a two-phase heuristic. Phase 1 allows independent
computations of protection routings for each destination, while
Phase 2 considers them jointly and attempts to modify them
to optimize performance without hurting protectability.

C. NP-completeness of protection routing
This section analyzes the algorithmic complexity of computing a protection routing. For that purpose, we formulate the
PR problem as follows.
• Instance: Given an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a
destination node d ∈ V .
• Question: Does a protection routing destined to d exist?
Theorem 4.5: The PR problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.5 indicates that in an arbitrary graph there is no
known polynomial-time algorithm to solve the PR problem
unless P=NP. The proof (see [9]) is based on a reduction
from the 3SAT problem. Heuristics are, therefore, required to
compute protection routings.

V. H EURISTIC D ESIGN

B. Phase 1 - Greedy search
Phase 1 uses a greedy search with a cost function Fd , d ∈ V ,
that focuses on Ωd but remains congestion aware. Congestion
is not explicitly accounted for in Fd to preserve independent
computations across destinations. It is used to influence the
greedy exploration of the solution space.
Specifically, prior to Phase 1, a standard traffic optimization
routine, e.g., [5], is run to assess the best network congestion
cost Φopt in the absence of protectability considerations. This
provides routings, Rdopt , d ∈ V , that achieve Φopt , as well as a
benchmark against which to compare network congestion costs
under protection routing. Each routing Rdopt can be computed
using a shortest path algorithm with appropriate link weights.
These link weights are used in Phase 1 to compute a deviation
||Rd − Rdopt || between a proposed protection routing
P Rd and
Rdopt . This deviation is measured4 using Γd =
i∈V Γi,d ,
where Γi,d denotes the distance from node i to destination d
under Rd , with distances computed using the link weights of
Rdopt . The smaller Γd , the “closer” Rd is to Rdopt . This metric
guides the selection of solutions during Phase 1 as follows.
The cost function Fd is defined as Fd = hΩd , Γd i where
ha1 , b1 i > ha2 , b2 i if and only if a1 > a2 , or a1 = a2 and
b1 > b2 . This gives precedence to protectability, while favoring
solutions with lower congestion costs (as measured through
4 Other

measures can easily be accommodated.

Γd ) when it does not affect protectability. The optimization
carried out in Phase 1 is then of the form
∀d ∈ V

minimize Fd = hΩd , Γd i .
Rd

(1)

Note that although Γd in Fd accounts for congestion, computations for different destinations are still decoupled. This
is because Γd is computed based on a fixed reference point
(i.e., the link weights that produced Rdopt ). This also avoids
evaluating the cost function Φ for each candidate routing, an
operation that in itself has a significant computational cost.
A “Greedy-search” heuristic (see [9] for details) is used to
minimize Eq. 1. It was inspired by approximation algorithms
for the 3SAT problem from which the NPC of the PR problem
is reduced, and operates on routings limited to trees (i.e., each
node except the destination has only one PNH). There are two
motivations for the latter. First, assigning multiple PNHs to a
node may affect the protectability of other nodes as discussed
in Section III-A. Second, the sheer number of possible combinations involving multiple PNHs makes it computationally
impractical to consider them all. Allowing multiple PNHs can
obviously reduce congestion through better load-balancing.
This aspect is considered separately in Phase 2.
¡
¢
The heuristic starts with an initial routing Rd = T Rdopt
obtained by extracting a tree from Rdopt (when multiple nexthops are available, one is randomly selected). The main loop
uses local feasibility checks to explore improvements in Fd
when swapping the PNH of node i ∈ V \ {d}. This process
repeats until Fd shows no improvement for all nodes. A
diversification step is then executed, and generates a new
random shortest path tree rooted at d. Unlike the first tree
based on Rdopt , the new tree is generated using random link
weights uniformly selected in [1, 1000]. This ensures that after
exploring the neighborhood of Rdopt , the search restarts at a
different point of the solution space5 . The heuristic stops after
P diversifications without improvement to Fd .
C. Phase 2 - Load-balancing
The routing trees Rd∗ , ∀d ∈ V , of Phase 1 are used as inputs
to Phase 2. Phase 2 seeks to assign multiple PNHs to nodes to
better distribute traffic (load-balance), subject to the constraint
that the number of unprotected nodes cannot increase.
Its main loop (see again [9] for details) examines each node
i in decreasing order6 of its congestion, and tries to assign
it multiple PNHs to better load-balance traffic and reduce
its congestion cost. Note that Phase 2 involves evaluating Φ
for each candidate routing, and this is where the bulk of its
computational cost lies. The heuristic stops when Φ cannot be
further reduced through new PNH assignments.
5 Other diversification methods were tried, e.g., shuffling a subset of PNHs
in the tree, generating increasingly perturbed versions of Rdopt , etc. The more
diverse starting points of a random diversification consistently resulted in a
better exploration of the solution space.
6 Other orders, e.g., random, fixed, were tried and found to perform worse.

D. SNH assignment
The first two phases of the heuristic produce a set of routings
that maximize the number of protected nodes while minimizing congestion cost by load-balancing across multiple PNHs,
as long as it does not affect protectability. By definition of
protectability, all protected nodes have at least one SNH they
can use in case of failure to forward packets on an alternate
path that delivers packets to the destination solely through
PNH forwarding. As discussed earlier, the restriction to PNH
forwarding imposed by Definition 3.3 precludes backup paths
involving multiple SNHs, which could improve protectability.
Allowing such paths, however, requires some care to avoid
loops. In this section, we describe an algorithm that assigns
SNH (when a choice is available) to allow backup paths
involving multiple SNHs, while ensuring the absence of loops.
The algorithm is outlined for a given d with details in [9].
Rd = (V, Ed ) denotes the routing for d produced by
Phases 1 and 2, where Ed ⊆ E is the set of primary links.
After failure f , Rdf = (V f , Edf ) denotes the residual routing
after removing the failed component(s). Let Sdf : V → V ∪{∅}
denote the SNH assignment mapping for failure f , with
Sdf (i) ∈ V ∪ {∅} the SNH assigned to node i. An empty
assignment, i.e., Sdf (i) = ∅, implies that there is either no
need to assign an SNH to node i because its PNH is not
affected by f, or no suitable SNH can be found. Our goal
is to explore SNH assignments that maximize protectability
when allowing³ backup paths that involve multiple
´ SNHs.
f
f
f S
f
Let Hd = V , Ed i∈V,S f (i)6=∅ (i, Sd (i)) be a routing
d

under failure f . Note that Hdf combines Rdf and Sdf , and hence
permits the use of multiple SNHs. This calls for additional
precautions when assigning SNHs. Specifically, assume that
node k is a candidate SNH for node i after failure f . Node k
can be selected if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(H1) Hdf remains a DAG after the addition of link (i, k); (H2)
Node k and all its downstream nodes (except d) have an outdegree of at least one in Hdf . Condition (H1) ensures that
loops are avoided, while Conditions (H1) and (H2) together
guarantee packets delivery to d. Using these two conditions,
SNHs can be assigned (again, see [9] for details) to improve
protectability of nodes affected by failure f and with initially
(after Phases 1 and 2) no feasible SNH, i.e., Sdf (i) = ∅. This
continues until no SNH assignment satisfying conditions (H1)
and (H2) is found. Note that the fact that PNHs remain fixed
is in part what keeps computational complexity manageable.
VI. T RADING P ROTECTABILITY FOR P ERFORMANCE
The cost function Fd gives strict precedence to protectability. A natural question is whether this can be relaxed to tradeoff protectability for performance. Such a trade-off can be
formulated using the following optimization:
minimize Φ

(2)

Rd ,d∈V

subject to
Ωd ≤ (1 + εd ) Ω∗d

∀d ∈ V

(3)

where Ω∗d denotes the smallest possible number of unprotected
nodes for destination d, and εd ≥ 0 controls how much
protectability can be traded-off for performance.
In realizing such a trade-off, computational complexity is
again the main concern. Our proposed solution is based on
two observations: (i) computing Ω∗d , ∀d ∈ V , as required by
Eq. 3, calls for performing Phase 1; and (ii) a large number
of routings are examined during Phase 1. A natural option
is to take advantage of the availability of those routings.
Specifically, we keep all routings examined during Phase 1,
and at the end of Phase 1 we identify those that satisfy
Eq. 3. We then select for each destination d, the routing that
minimizes Γd . Those routings can subsequently be further
improved by invoking Phase 2.
This approach leverages the computational tractability of the
previous heuristic (it has the same computational complexity,
and avoids most expensive computations of the cost function
Φ), and the additional memory it requires to store the routings
examined during Phase 1 is relatively small. Intelligently
discarding routings whenever they fail to satisfy Eq. 3 based
on the current estimate of Ω∗d can further reduce this memory.
VII. E VALUATION
This section assesses the extent to which our heuristic can
find efficient protection routings, and explores the trade-off
between performance and protectability. It starts with a review
of the environment in which this evaluation is conducted.
A. Evaluation settings
1) Network topologies: Both real and synthesized topologies are used.
• RN: Random topology of given average node degree.
• PL: Power-law topology based on the preferential attachment model [2].
• AS: Real topologies from the Rocketfuel project [17] and
labeled by their AS numbers7 .
Link capacities are all set equal to unity with traffic demand
(see below) used to generate heterogeneous load levels because
heterogeneous loads can be generated either by varying traffic
demand or link capacity.
2) Traffic matrix: The traffic matrix M = [r (s, t)]|V |×|V |
is generated using a gravity model [8], [11] as follows: Traffic
volume from node s to node t is defined as r (s, t) =
at
bs P e
ai where bs is the total traffic originating at node
i∈V \{s} e
s, and is given by

with prob 0.6
(4a)
 Uniform(10, 50),
bs =



Uniform(80, 130),
Uniform(150, 200),

with prob 0.35
with prob 0.05

(4b)
(4c)

Uniform(a, b) denotes a random variable uniformly distributed
in [a, b], at is the “mass” of P
node t which is proportional to the
number of links it has and i∈V ai = 1. The larger a node’s
mass, the more traffic it attracts. Using bs , it generates three
different levels of heterogeneous load. Finally, M is scaled to
produce a reasonable link utilization in the network.
7 Nodes

isolated from the giant component are removed.

3) Heuristic setting: Our heuristic involves only one parameter, P, used as the stopping criterion of Phase 1. We set
P = 10, so that Phase 1 is stopped if there is no improvement
after 10 diversification rounds. This value was chosen as
it balances solution quality and computational time in our
experiments.
4) Comparison: We use the proposed two-phase heuristic
and the SNH assignment algorithm to compute protection
routing solutions, and the results are denoted by PR. Our
solutions are compared to the following previous works:
• SP: Routings computed by the OSPF optimization in [5].
• DIVR: Routings computed by DIV-R from [14].
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• O2: Routings computed by the pattern-based algorithm
of [15].
We believe that this provides a reasonable coverage of both
the heuristic’s performance across different networks, and its
comparison to other alternatives. SP is commonly used for
intra-domain routing in large ISP’s, e.g., [11], and focuses
solely on performance. DIVR, like [12], seeks to maximize
the number of PNHs at each node but without considering the
use of SNHs after failures. O2 optimizes for protectability,
but is oblivious to performance. In the experiments, a node
is said to be protected with respect to a destination if it has
a valid re-routing option for that destination after any single
component failure.
B. Benefits of protection routing
We first investigate the effectiveness of PR on synthesized
topologies with mean degree varying from three to five. Fig. 2
shows the numbers of protected nodes across destinations,
with the x-axis showing destination IDs sorted in ascending
order of the number of protected nodes under SP. The results
illustrate that PR significantly improves protectability when
compared to other solutions. Moreover, the results show that
the gap is still present even in richly connected topologies
for which, as indicated by Theorems 4.1 and 4.4, a protection
routing is more likely to exist. Hence, even in those topologies,
protection routings remain difficult to find unless an efficient
heuristic such as PR is used.
It should be noted that the relatively poor performance of
DIVR can, as mentioned earlier, be partly attributed to its focus
on link failures that makes it more susceptible to node failures.
Another finding from the figure is that a mean degree of 4
(i.e., 70 nodes and 140 links) appears sufficient to realize near
100% protectability with PR. This indicates that protectability
should be feasible in practice under reasonable connectivity.
The results of another set of evaluations carried out on real
ISP topologies are shown in Fig. 3, where the mean degrees
of AS1221, AS1755 and AS3967 are 2.90, 3.70 and 3.72,
respectively. The figure offers similar conclusions, namely, PR
is effective in computing protection routings, and its advantage
over other solutions remains even in richly connected ASes
such as AS3967.
8 This algorithm is chosen among several O2 heuristics, because, as reported
in [15], it provides better protectability.

TABLE I
N ETWORK PERFORMANCE ACROSS TOPOLOGIES .
Topology [# nodes, # links]
Avg link load (PR)
Avg link load (SP)
Avg link load (DIVR)
Avg link load (O2)
Max link load (PR)
Max link load (SP)
Max link load (DIVR)
Max link load (O2)
Increase in Φ under PR (%)
Increase in Φ under DIVR (%)
Increase in Φ under O2 (%)

RN [70,105]
0.20
0.18
0.22
0.18
0.86
0.66
0.90
1.12
48.06
55.05
495

RN [70,140]
0.31
0.28
0.44
0.32
0.66
0.66
1.36
1.18
11.79
4690
978

RN [70,175]
0.22
0.20
0.36
0.25
0.55
0.55
1.23
1.29
0.12
3284
1358

Table I shows network performance metrics across topologies, where comparisons with SP reflect the cost of protectability. In the case of Φ, increases relative to SP are reported for
PR, DIVR and O2. Under PR, network performance typically
degrades slightly compared to SP. This is expected because PR
leaves some links unused under normal conditions to ensure
they are available for protection after failures. This cost is,
however, small, especially in comparison to that incurred by
DIVR and O2, which often result in very high levels of congestion. This is in part because both are oblivious to performance
goals when computing routings, and demonstrates that PR is
successful at reconciling both.
C. Trading protectability for performance
Following the discussion of Section VI, we study whether
it is possible to improve performance if we are willing to
sacrifice some protectability. For simplicity, we assume that
in Eq. 3, εd = ε, ∀d ∈ V .
Table II illustrates the trade-off between protectability and
performance for two topologies. The table uses results for
ε = 0 (i.e., no trade-off) as a benchmark for the decrease9
in Φ realized by an increase in Ωd , the average number of
unprotected nodes across all destinations for different ε’s. For
reference, we also give Ωd in the table. The traffic matrices
used in the experiments produce roughly 70% maximum link
utilization when ε = 0.
The main observation from the results of Table II is that
the proposed heuristic successfully realizes different tradeoffs between protectability and performance. As a result,
it provides network operators with a tunable solution for
selecting a routing that provides the desired balance between
protectability and performance. In addition, since the solution
has essentially the same computational complexity as the base
heuristic, it can be readily used in practice as we discuss next.
D. Computational complexity
To support our claim of computational efficiency, we report
computational times for some large topologies. Specifically,
run times were 1.7 hours, 1.63 hours, and 0.79 hours for the
RN [70,175], PL [70,175], and AS 1221 topologies, respectively. These results are obtained with a Pentium Xeon 2.66
GHz machine. Note that the computation times are realized
9 The

relative decrease in Φ is at most 100% which corresponds to Φ = 0.

PL [70,105]
0.24
0.21
0.25
0.22
0.66
0.67
1.00
1.33
15.12
91.86
4455

PL [70,140]
0.21
0.19
0.28
0.23
0.53
0.62
1.56
1.53
10.60
13203
11112

PL [70,175]
0.29
0.28
0.43
0.35
0.74
0.84
2.92
2.60
-3.98
56690
44917

AS 1221
0.11
0.10
0.12
0.11
0.93
0.93
1.13
1.30
3.73
492
3792

AS 1755
0.26
0.23
0.31
0.24
0.98
0.90
1.57
1.23
19.72
3619
1246

AS 3967
0.15
0.13
0.18
0.14
0.91
0.89
1.17
1.18
32.51
889
1667

TABLE II
T RADEOFF BETWEEN PROTECTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE .
ε

0
0.2
0.5
1
1.5
Random topology (70 nodes, 105 links)
Decrease in Φ (%)
0
9.74
19.85
24.81
28.09
Increase in Ωd (%)
0
14.81
47.25
78.81
127.40
Ωd (in nodes)
6.75
7.75
9.94
12.07
15.35
AS3967 (79 nodes, 147 links)
Decrease in Φ (%)
0
10.17
16.99
19.29
20.77
Increase in Ωd (%)
0
10.45
35.67
57.81
87.08
Ωd (in nodes)
8.13
8.98
11.03
12.83
15.21

2
30.90
176.59
18.67
22.68
126.07
18.38

without trying to explicitly take advantage of the inherent
parallelism of the computations (the n routings of Phase 1
are independent and can be computed in parallel). The other
metric of importance when assessing computational cost is
memory consumption. None of the experiments required more
than 300MB of memory.
VIII. C ONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the feasibility of protection routing in a centralized routing system, which displays heightened
sensitivity to failures due to latency in responses from the
central server. The paper identified topological properties that
affect the feasibility of protection routing and established that
computing protection routings is NP-hard. It developed an
efficient heuristic to compute routings that not only optimize
protectability, but also minimize its performance cost. The
heuristic was shown to outperform earlier proposals, and its
efficacy demonstrated for a range of topologies.
There are many directions in which this work can be
extended or built on. The first is to demonstrate the feasibility
of protectability in a centralized routing system through an
implementation. Another direction of interest is to develop
“weighted” protectability solutions, i.e., to account for the fact
that certain nodes are more important than others. Yet another
area is to develop update mechanisms at the central server that
are aware of which nodes have protection and which do not,
and select update orderings based on this information and the
need to avoid loops when updating forwarding states.
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